We explore the political economy of the Sheppard-Towner Act as well as analyze the effect of Sheppard-Towner grants on state child health expenditures. We find that the level at which states participated in Sheppard-Towner was strongly (negatively) influenced by the number of physicians in the state and the number of Catholics. The length of time since women's suffrage was a powerful predictor of the level of a state's participation. Notably, states with the most experience with how women voted were the ones that participated at the lowest level, and states that received suffrage later were more likely to participate. We also extend the literature on intergovernmental grants by examining the effect of SheppardTowner grant money on state child health expenditures. Overall, we find that state expenditures on child health under Sheppard-Towner were correlated with federal grant amounts, but the strength of the relationship differed across states. In particular, states with longer periods of suffrage were less responsive to federal grant money than states with more recent suffrage. Thus, our results confirm the existence of a "flypaper effect" that varies according to when states enacted women's suffrage; the flypaper effect is weakest among states that enacted suffrage early and stronger among states that enacted it later.
I. Introduction
In 1921, Congress passed the Promotion of the Welfare and Hygiene of Maternity and Infancy Act, more commonly known as the Sheppard-Towner Act. Sheppard-Towner was one of the first federal matching grant programs; each participating state received $5,000 outright and then the federal government matched state expenditures on infant and maternal health programs on a one-for-one basis up to an explicit cap determined by a state's population. Despite its uncontroversial goal of reducing maternal and infant mortality, the Act generated a tremendous amount of controversy. The State of Massachusetts challenged the law in the Courts, claiming that the use of matching grants violated states' rights, while the American Medical Association (AMA) charged that it was the first step down the path towards socialized medicine. The political battles culminated in a bitter fight for funding re-authorization in Congress in 1926, which resulted in two additional years of appropriations in exchange for the automatic repeal of the law on June 30, 1929.
Historians have argued that Sheppard-Towner originally passed despite significant opposition because politicians feared reprisal from newly enfranchised women who were awarded suffrage in 1920 (Lemons 1990) . When politicians learned that women did not necessarily vote as a bloc, Sheppard-Towner was repealed in the face of ardent opposition from the AMA. (See Lemons 1990; Skocpol 1992; Ladd-Taylor 1994) .
However, this simple packaging of Sheppard-Towner ignores a great deal of variation in how states participated in the program, as shown in Figure 1 . States were where much of the real action took place; they had to enact enabling legislation, set up special state boards of child hygiene, and put up their own funds to get the federal grants. Three states (CT, IL and MA) refused to participate at all. Other states participated in some years and not in others. Some states participated fully, and some took only partial advantage of the federal matching dollars.
Did this variation reflect the varying strength of the AMA in different states? Or was it related to the differences across states in the timing of women's suffrage? If it is true that SheppardTowner was enacted because politicians were responding to the possible threat of new women voters, then states that had enacted suffrage earlier may have been more likely to limit their participation in the Sheppard-Towner program relative to states that had only recently accepted suffrage and who had less experience with how women voted.
Looking at the receipt of federal grants can only tell us part of the story of SheppardTowner, however. Perhaps the more important question is, how did states use Sheppard-Towner funds? The objective in providing federal grants was to induce states to initiate or increase spending on infant and maternal health programs. But did they? After the repeal of SheppardTowner, the AMA argued that the federal grants had simply crowded out state funds.
In this paper, we examine this variation in participation in Sheppard-Towner and then consider how the federal grants interacted with the political and social characteristics of states to affect state expenditures on child welfare and other public health programs. First, we analyze how the enfranchisement of women affected a state's response to the Sheppard-Towner program.
Were states in which suffrage was recently passed more likely to participate (or to participate at a greater level) in the Sheppard-Towner program than in states that enacted suffrage earlier? Second, we investigate whether the AMA's criticism of the Sheppard-Towner Act as supplanting state spending was warranted. Using data from the Children's Bureau and the Financial Statistics of the States, we examine how state expenditures on child and maternal health programs responded to the Sheppard-Towner grants. We also use a unique feature of the Act -its repeal in 1929 -to provide another perspective on crowding out: how did the states respond to the withdrawal of federal monies?
We find that states that implemented suffrage earlier did in fact participate in SheppardTowner at a lower level than those states that enacted suffrage later. We also find that opposition from physicians did have an impact; states with more physicians per capita participated at a lower level. With respect to state expenditures on child and maternal health programs, states that enacted suffrage before 1910 were much less responsive to Sheppard-Towner monies than other states, a finding that is consistent with the hypothesis that support for Sheppard-Towner may have waned as politicians gained more experience with the voting patterns of women. Finally, we find that after the Act was repealed in 1929, state expenditures on child health declined substantially in states that had accepted federal grants, but remained relatively constant in states that enacted suffrage earlier (and that were less responsive to the grants to begin with), and in states that had early child health movements.
II.. The Political Battles over Sheppard-Towner
The passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act in 1921 marked the culmination of maternalists' efforts during the Progressive Era to involve the federal government in a broad campaign to improve the health of mothers and their children. The Children's Bureau's first attempt to enact legislation came in 1918, when Representative Jeannette Pickering Rankin (R-Montana) sponsored a bill calling for a yearly appropriation of $10,000 per state, with $1 million in additional funds to be divided among states based on their share of the U.S. rural population, and contingent on the state legislature approving matching funds. The purpose of the bill was educational in nature; funds were to be used to encourage instruction in hygiene and maternity, and not to provide medical care. Despite the fact that no one appeared before the House Committee on Labor to oppose the bill, it did not reach the floor of Congress (Lindenmeyer 1997, p. 79 (Lindenmeyer 1997, p. 83) . While the AMA was slow to organize against compulsory health insurance in the late 1910s, the organization took a definitive stance against compulsory health insurance in 1920 (Burrow 1963, p. 150) . The AMA viewed Sheppard-Towner in the same vein as compulsory health insurance: an attempt by government to intervene in medical care. The AMA strongly opposed government control over medical service, and viewed the provision of care for individuals as best achieved "…through voluntary selftaxation of voters in a political unit to pay for the necessary local facilities for the prevention of disease and the promotion of health" (JAMA, February 5, 1921) .
1 Physicians feared that government intervention would eventually lead to non-medical provision of medical services.
1 While the AMA as a whole was opposed, certain groups of physicians within the AMA supported SheppardTowner. Pediatricians supported Sheppard-Towner; in fact, the American Academy of Pediatrics was founded as an independent group in 1922 because pediatricians disagreed with the AMA's stance. Other medical groups also supported the bill's passage, including the Medical Women's National Association (Lindenmeyer 1997, p. 87) .
Anti-suffragists joined physicians in opposing the proposed Sheppard-Towner legislation. (Lemons 1990, p. 157) . Anti-suffragist Elizabeth Lowell Putnam argued that the bill was objectionable because it not only interfered with states' rights, it also placed matters of medicine into the hands of laypeople. In a letter to the editor published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Putnam wrote, "the hearings have been carried on as if the fact that a woman had borne a child, or indeed, just happened to be a woman, entitled her per se to medical knowledge on the subject of the proper care of childbirth…the bill will do no good" (Putnam, 1921 claimed to speak for 20 million members, lobbied strongly for its passage and generated significant grass-roots support (Lemons 1969, p. 778 Lott and Kenny (1999) and Miller (2008) . Lott and Kenny (1999) find that suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures for functions women generally supported, such as education, sanitation and hospitals. Suffrage also generated more liberal voting patterns among federal representatives. Miller (2008) similarly finds that suffrage laws generated large increases in public health spending.
address asked the legislature to pass Sheppard-Towner legislation. In the summer of 1923, the legislature did so.
The AMA played an even more influential role in some of the state battles than in the federal one. Opposition to Sheppard-Towner was particularly strong among the state medical societies of Ohio, New York, Indiana, Massachusetts and Illinois, with the latter two states joining Connecticut in refusing to even participate in the Act (Lemons 1990, p. 163) . One
Illinois physician wrote a letter to the editor assailing the bill, arguing that the bill would ultimately lead to a "… tax eating corps of prairie midwives and old maids who are to raise the offspring at taxpayer expense" (Butterfield, 1923) . Physicians from Massachusetts testified against the bill in hearings (original source Lemons 1990 p. 164 ).
Other opposition came from groups who felt that Sheppard-Towner violated states'
rights. Governor Miller of New York was in this camp. The Chicago Tribune opposed the Act, stating that it was a "trick" to "deceive" taxpayers who thought they were receiving a gift from the federal government but who would in reality just pay for it through their taxes (Tribune, April 22, 1923) . In another editorial, the Tribune expressed that Sheppard-Towner promoted the evils of "the centralization of government, the development of bureaucracy, (and the) weakening influence of paternalism." Moreover, the Tribune argued that it set a "dangerous and evil precedent" (Tribune, April 25, 1923 in blocs on issues (as Congressmen had feared), but rather split along party lines (Meckel 1990, pp. 214-15) . While the reauthorization easily passed in the House, a filibuster led by conservative anti-suffragist Senator Lawrence Phipps of Colorado blocked action in the Senate.
Eventually, supporters accepted a compromise that extended the appropriations through June 30, 1929, with an automatic repeal of the law at that time. Although proponents believed the political winds would become more favorable as time passed, they did not. In 1929, Sheppard-Towner was repealed.
IV. An Empirical Examination of the Politics of Participation
Although the politics of Sheppard-Towner played out in a unique way in each state, there seem to be some prominent common threads. An empirical analysis of state participation in the program will allow us to assess the role of doctors and the Catholic Church in determining a state's response to Sheppard-Towner. It will also allow us to explore the factor cited by historians as the key to the success of the federal legislation: women's suffrage. Politicians wanting to woo, or at least seeking not to offend women may have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the legislation given that infant and maternal mortality were seen as "women's" issues. Therefore, we measure a state's participation in a given year as the ratio of the amount of Sheppard-Towner funds accepted by a state in that year to the maximum grant available to the state. By definition, the value of this variable is bounded by zero and one, so we employ a twosided tobit model to examine its variation.
We explore the role of women's suffrage by examining whether participation in Sheppard-Towner varied by the length of time women in the state had had the vote. We divide states into four categories based on when a state enacted women's suffrage: before 1910, 1910-1914, 1915-1919, and in 1920 Another potential opponent of Sheppard-Towner was the Catholic Church. The U.S.
Census has never collected data on the religious affiliations of individuals. However, it does collect data on the membership of churches of different denominations and other religious organizations in its Census of Religious Bodies. We use data from the 1916, 1926, and 1936 Censuses of Religious Bodies to construct state-level data on the strength of the Catholic Church.
We construct a "percent Catholic" measure for each of the census years by dividing the total membership in Catholic churches in a state by the state's population. We then linearly interpolate between the three census dates to construct annual data.
A state's response to Sheppard-Towner was likely also influenced by its engagement in child health programs prior to the program's enactment. While Sheppard-Towner was seen as an innovation in terms of federal engagement in public health issues, the types of activities it promoted had been implemented by several states long before 1921. The federal program was indeed based on the experiences of these state programs. Table 1 be that the costs of participation were even greater for states that already had established child hygiene divisions in that participating in Sheppard-Towner meant relinquishing some degree of autonomy.
We also include variables intended to capture the more general economic, social and political characteristics of a state: per capita personal income, the percent of the population that was black, the percent of the population that lived in urban areas, and indicators for whether the state's governor was a member of the Democratic party and whether the state legislature had experienced a change in the majority party in one or both houses in that year. 4 We include the "political shift" variables that Fishback and Kantor (1998) The economic theory on intergovernmental grants supports the AMA's criticism of Sheppard-Towner; but surprisingly -at least to public economists -the empirical work on intergovernmental grants does not. Many studies find that grants have very large effects on lower-level government expenditures, much larger in fact than those generated by equivalent increases in taxpayer income. In other words, grants increase the spending on the targeted programs by much more than would be predicted by the income effect of the grant alone. Many studies even find that expenditures increase one-for-one with grant amounts. 9 Rather than crowding out appropriations by grant recipients, grant money seems to be used as targeted.
Arthur Okun dubbed this phenomenon the "flypaper effect" because money doled out through grants "sticks where it hits" (Hines and Thaler 1995, 218).
The flypaper effect is so at odds with basic economic theory that an entire literature has developed trying to explain it. Some studies try to reconcile the theory and the evidence by arguing that the flypaper effect is the result of econometric errors; for instance, the model is Hines and Thaler (1995) argue that the flypaper effect may not be due to errors on the part of econometricians or voters, but rather a real phenomenon arising from behavioral tendencies observed in other economic settings: loss aversion and lack of fungibility. If taxpayers are loss averse, they will be much more sensitive to increases in taxes than to decreases in taxes. The political gain of lowering taxes in response to the receipt of grant will therefore be much smaller than the political cost of having to increase taxes in the future if the grant is repealed. Moreover, voters may not view grant monies and tax revenues as fungible.
They may put pressure on their elected officials to use grant monies as intended.
Hines and Thaler's model of taxpayer behavior is compelling not only because it can explain the flypaper effect; this model also provides a way of thinking about how the impact of intergovernmental grants may differ by targeted activity and jurisdiction. The impact of grants, for instance, would be expected to be larger for programs that were more visible or prominent in voters' preferences as well as in jurisdictions where the program proponents had the most political influence. The effects of grants would likewise be expected to be greatest when the grant amount is large relative to the prevailing level of expenditures. In such circumstances, the local government would have to increase expenditures on the targeted activity to demonstrate to voters that the grant was being used as intended. But this also means that crowding out is also possible in this model. When the grant amount is small relative to prevailing expenditures, the local government may use the grant to increase spending in other areas.
Thus, the behavioral economics framework proposed by Hines and Thaler could reconcile the mix of findings in the literature on intergovernmental grants. Intergovernmental grants have been found to have sizable effects on expenditures on education, an area always in the public eye and where expenditure levels are frequently constrained by the ability to raise taxes (Wyckoff 1991) . At the same time, federal grants to states for highway construction --which tend to be small relative to state spending on highways -have been found to crowd out state funds (Knight 2002; and Miller 1974) .
This framework could also be used to explain the variation in state fiscal response to In column 3, we present the model with interactions in which we have allowed for state fixed effects. As with the participation models, the drawback to adding state fixed effects is that some of the key variables of interest drop out of the model. However, the advantage of the state fixed effect model here is that it addresses one form of the endogeneity problem. If we think that the endogeneity is due to an unobserved and fixed characteristic of a state that influences both grant receipt and child health expenditures, the inclusion of state fixed effects could eliminate this problem. Although the fixed characteristics of states like the timing of suffrage, drop out of the model when state fixed effects are included, the interactions of these variables and the grant amount per capita remain. These interactions capture differences across states in how the changes in child health expenditures from year-to-year were related to changes in SheppardTowner grants per capita.
The first thing to notice in column 3 is that the coefficient on the per capita federal grant is much lower than that found in column 2. This is what would be expected if there were a fixed state characteristic that influenced both the take-up of Sheppard-Towner grants and child health expenditures. The model in column 3 implies that a 1-cent increase in the federal grant per capita led to a 1.6-cent increase in a state's expenditures on child health. None of the interactions between grant levels and suffrage experience meet standard levels of significance, but the point estimate for the interaction for the earliest women's suffrage enactors is large and negative. The coefficient on the interaction term with the indicator for having a division of child hygiene before 1921 is statistically significant and sizable. Taken together with the coefficient on the non-interacted grant level, this coefficient implies that in states that had divisions of child hygiene in 1921 a 1-cent increase in the per capita Sheppard-Towner grant amount lead to only a 0.68 cent increase in child health expenditures. This is consistent with the notion that in these states, at least some of the Sheppard-Towner monies was being diverted for other uses.
The overall picture that emerges from Towner grants induced states to spend more on child health programs, but where did these funds come from? One possibility is that the funds were diverted from other public health programs.
The results in Table 7 Rude (1920) and White House Conference on Child Health and Protection, (1932, pp.280-281) . 
